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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JAMES DEVON LANIER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880101 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
The Jurisdictional Statement, Statement of the Case, and 
Statement of the Facts are set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 
iii, 1-3. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to 
suppress his prior convictions, and such error was not harmless. 
The State failed to sustain its burden of showing that the probative 
value outweighed the prejudicial effect of the prior convictions and 
therefore the convictions were not admissible under Rule 609(a)(1). 
Nor were they crimes of dishonesty under Rule 609(a)(2). Had 
Appellant testified, there is a likelihood the outcome of the case 
would have been different. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING 
TO SUPPRESS MR. LANIER'S PRIOR CONVICTIONS. 
A. THE STATE FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN UNDER 
RULE 609(A)(1) OF PERSUADING THE COURT THAT THE 
PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE PRIOR CONVICTIONS 
OUTWEIGHED THEIR PREJUDICIAL EFFECT. 
"The prosecution has the burden under Rule 609(a) of 
persuading the court that the prior convictions should not be 
suppressed. . . . [Citations omitted]." State v. Gentry/ 747 P.2d 
1032 (Utah 1987). Pursuant to subsection (1) of Rule 609(a), this 
burden includes establishing "that the probative value of admitting 
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant. . . ." Rule 609(a)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983). 
As outlined in Appellant's opening brief at 9-14, an 
application of the five "[f]actors to be considered when balancing 
probative value against prejudicial effect" as set forth in State v. 
Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), establishes that the State did 
not sustain its burden under subsection (1) in the present case. 
The State acknowledges that in the present case, both the 
remoteness of the prior convictions and the similarity between the 
robbery conviction and the charges in instant case weigh against 
admission. Respondent's Brief at 5. The State argues, however that 
Mr. Lanier's prior convictions are distinguishable from those 
involved in Banner and Gentry because they are relevant to 
credibility and that "people who have committed crimes in the past 
are more likely to try to cover up their responsibility in the crime 
on trial to avoid the harsher penalties associated with having been 
previously convicted." Respondent's Brief at 6. 
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Crimes of burglary and robbery do not "inherently reflect 
on a defendant's character for truth and veracityU" and "shed[] 
about the same light as any crime involving moral turpitude." 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334-5. The State's argument that 
persons who have felony convictions are more likely to lie to avoid 
harsher penalties fails to distinguish between felonies and comes 
very close to arguing that simply because an individual has a felony 
convictionf he is likely to lie under oath. 
The State's assertion that burglary and robbery are 
deceitful acts since "[t]he burglar who secretly enters the private 
home concealing his or her presence" (Respondent's Brief at 10) is 
dishonest as is the robber who enters a store beforehand, then later 
disguises himself1 is also applicable to most crimes. A rapist 
often sneaks around a house or other premises, concealing his 
presence until he locates a victim. An inmate attempting to escape 
similarly conceals his whereabouts. Yet, this Court has suppressed 
convictions for both rape and escape under subsection (1) of Rule 
609. See Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334-35; Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1037-38. 
The State also seems to suggest that where "credibility 
issues" are crucial, the Court should be more lenient in admitting 
1 The State's suggestion that the male robber in this 
case was deceitful since "the robber enter[ed] a store posing as a 
customer and later on, disguises himself to avoid identification" 
(Respondent's Brief at 10) is misleading since, in this case, there 
was no evidence that the male robber entered the store prior to the 
robbery. Furthermore, there was no evidence that such "deception" 
occurred in the robbery for which Appellant had been previously 
convicted and which the trial court refused to suppress. 
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the prior convictions. Respondents Brief at 6-7. On the contrary, 
in both Banner and Gentry, this Court focused on the importance of 
the accused's testimony in conjunction with the role of credibility 
issues in the case and found in favor of exclusion because "the 
accused's testimony and the importance of credibility in this case 
were critical in determining whose version of the facts was correct 
since the prosecution's case included no decisive nontestimonial 
evidence." Banner, 717 P.2d at 1335; see also Gentry, 747 P.2d at 
1037-8. In the present case, where the State's case depended 
primarily on the long-winded and often inconsistent testimony of 
Mr. Martinez, Mr. Lanier's testimony was critical, "warranting 
exclusion of the convictions." Banner, 717 P.2d at 1334. 
The State's attempt to argue that Mr. Lanier's testimony 
was not crucial instead emphasizes just how crucial the testimony 
was in this case. As the State points out, defense counsel attacked 
the testimony of the witnesses and impeached their identification of 
him. Respondent's Brief at 7. The State points out that 
Mr. Lanier's testimony would have been in direct conflict with "the 
two prior identifications." Respondent's Brief at 7. Because the 
testimony would have been in conflict with that of the witnesses, 
and due to the impeachment of the witnesses' identification 
testimony, including evidence that Mr. Martinez was unable to 
describe the hair color of the robber immediately after the incident 
(R. 249) and was ninety percent certain that a photograph of someone 
other than the defendant showed the robber (R. 255), the testimony 
of Mr. Lanier was critical to this case. 
The only arguments advanced by the State are that robbery 
and burglary may be slightly more probative of credibility than some 
other crimes because a defendant might lie to avoid harsher 
penalties and that because credibility was important to the case, 
the convictions should be admitted. Even if such positions were 
accepted by this Court, they fail to outweigh the prejudicial effect 
of the convictions due to the similarity between them and the crime 
charged, the remoteness of the convictions, and the need for the 
testimony of the defendant. 
The trial court abused its discretion in finding that the 
State sustained its burden of showing that the probative value of 
the convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect, and in finding 
the convictions admissible under Rule 609(a)(1), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1983). 
B. MR. LANIER'S CONVICTIONS WERE NOT ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER RULE 609(a) (2) . 
The State mistakenly relies on State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 
33 (Utah 1984), for the proposition that theft crimes are crimes of 
dishonesty. Respondent's Brief at 9. The State v. Cintron per 
curiam opinion was decided under the old rules of evidence and does 
not reflect the new direction taken in Utah since adoption of the 
federal rules of evidence. Specifically, State v. Cintron is 
inconsistent with Rule 609's more narrow interpretation of 
"dishonesty." This Court has stated that previous opinions which 
are inconsistent with the new direction taken since adopting the 
federal rules are overruled. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1334 
n. 40 (Utah 1986). State v. Cintron is just such an opinion and 
therefore should not be applied under Rule 609(a)(2). 
This analysis is buttressed by footnote 45 of State v. 
Banner where this Court pointed out that the prosecutorfs reliance 
at the trial court level on case law established prior to Rule 
609(a) was significant—and presumably not persuasive on appeal. 
Both this Court and the Utah State Bar Commission's Rules 
Committee's Preliminary Note to the Utah Rules of Evidence indicate 
a serious commitment to using the adoption of the federal rules of 
evidence as a fresh starting place for the law of evidence in this 
state, taking aim at seeking uniformity between the rules by looking 
to the federal rules for interpretaiton. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 
at 1333-34. The Cintron opinion violates this new direction and 
should not be relied upon. 
The State contends that "[o]ther courts have ruled that 
the theft-burglary-robbery type of crimes are admissible as crimes 
of "dishonesty" under Rule 609(a)(2)." Respondent's Brief at 11. 
Three of the four cases cited in support of this proposition—United 
States v. Ackridge, 370 F.Supp. 214 (E.D.Pa. 1973); United States v. 
Gray, 468 F.2d 257 (3rd Cir. 1972); and United States v. Baber, 447 
P.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1971)—predate Congress' adoption of the 
federal rules of evidence. The fourth case, United States v. 
Bianco, 419 F.Supp. 507 (E.D.Pa. 1976), decided after enactment of 
the federal rules, relied only upon pre-federal rules cases. As the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court pointed out in United States v. 
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Smith/ 551 P.2d 348, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1976), "[t]he simple answer to 
the government's argument is that none of these cases involved Rule 
609." The Smith court further explained that these opinions relying 
on pre-609 cases "are not controlling in this case and indeed are 
essentially irrelevant." Ij3. at 365. 
The enactment of the federal rules in 1975, and their 
adoption in Utah in 1983, represented significant changes in the 
treatment of prior convictions as impeachment evidence. The burden 
shifted, the judge's discretion was altered, and the analysis is 
distinct. Cases predating these changes therefore do not offer 
helpful insights. 
As discussed in Appellant's opening brief at 6-8, robbery 
and burglary are not crimes of dishonesty or false statement within 
the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2), and the trial court erred in 
admitting the convictions under this rule. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS. 
As the State points out, the relevant standard of review 
is as follows: 
[T]he standard for error in cases involving a 
wrongful failure to exclude prior convictions is 
whether "there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result for the defendant' 
[quotations omitted]." 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1038. 
In Gentry, this Court determined: 
After a review of the record, we are persuaded 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
result would have been different had defendant's 
prior convictions been excluded and had defendant 
taken the stand. Defendant's testimony might have 
convinced the jury that the events related by the 
victim were untrue. Because of this, we reverse 
defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial. 
Id. 
Similarly, in Banner, this Court reversed the defendant's 
conviction where the defendant did not take the stand after the 
trial court denied his motion to suppress his prior convictions. 
717 P.2d at 1335. This court pointed out that the defendant had 
filed a notice of alibi which he withdrew after the denial of the 
motion. The lack of corroborating nontestimonial evidence and the 
fact that the State relied chiefly on the testimony of two 
witnesses, one of whom had a past sexual relationship with the 
defendant, impacted on this Court's decision that "[a]fter a review 
of the record, we are not convinced that had the defendant 
testified, the outcome in this case would necessarily have been the 
same." _Id. at 1335. 
The present case is similar to Banner in that the 
defendant had an alibi defense which was not pursued after the 
motion to suppress was denied. The State relied primarily on two 
witnesses, one of whom was involved in the robbery, and had a 
history of drug problems. 
In addition, Mr. Martinez' testimony was not overly 
compelling. At one point, Mr. Martinez was ninety percent certain 
someone other than the defendant committed the robbery. Under such 
circumstances, there is a likelihood that the outcome of this case 
would have been different had the defendant testified. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant, JAMES DEVON LANIER, respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this case 
to the District Court for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this ((p day of November, 1988. 
<^JhL t cck2/ 
TOAN C . WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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